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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

QUINN MILLET,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT
Case No.

OHOl&l^

Judge
LOGAN CITY, DS BRIDGERLAND
APARTMENTS, INC., and CACHE AUTO
BOOTING SERVICE,
Defendants.

Plaintiff complains of the Defendants Logan City, a municipal corporation located in
Cache County, Utah, Ds Bridgerland Apartments, Inc., a Utah corporation with its principal
place of business in Cache County, Utah, and R and H Services, Incorporated, a Utah
corporation with its principal place of business located in Cache County, Utah, doing business as
Cache Auto Booting Service, and alleges as follows:

*

*

*

1. Some of the Claims for Relief arise under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States; Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 1983 and
Article I Sec. 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the federal questions raised hereunder pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1331.
3. At all times pertinent hereto, the Plaintiff was an adult over the age of eighteen years,
a resident of the State of Utah, a citizen of the United States of America and a student at Utah
State University and all the acts complained of herein occurred in Cache County.
4. On the 15th day of November, 2000 the Logan Municipal Council (hereafter
"Council") adopted and the Mayor approved Ordinance No. 2000-75 (Revised 11/15/00) titled
"AN ORDINANCE AMENDING LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 10.52.040 TO
INCLUDE REGULATION OF BOOTING PRACTICES IN THE CITY OF LOGAN",
hereinafter called the "Ordinance", a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The
Ordinance became effective by publication on the 24th day of November, 2000 and continues in
effect. The Ordinance is unconstitutional on the grounds hereinafter detailed. Attached hereto as
Exhibit "B" is a copy of the booting ordinance parts of the official minutes of nine Logan City
Council meetings (hereafter called "minutes" or "record") that led to the adoption of the
ordinance. Exhibits "A" and "B" are incorporated herein by this reference. The meetings covered
a period of over fifteen months.
5. The Plaintiff has standing to contest the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Plaintiffs
car was seized and immobilized by booting by the Defendant Cache Auto Booting Service
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(hereafter "Booter") acting for, and in the parking lot of Plaintiff s landlord, Defendant D's
Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. (hereafter "Landlord"), located in the City. The booting occurred
on the 10th day of September, 2003. The Booter then extorted $50.00 from Plaintiff as a
condition for the return of his (illegally) seized-booted car. The booting and extortion was done
by the Landlord and its Booter under the color of the authority of the unconstitutional Ordinance.
6. The Ordinance has three parts. This action challenges the constitutionality of parts one
and two only: The first is that part applied to the booting of Plaintiffs car under sub-sections D 1
and 2, which purports to conditionally legalize booting by landlords and their private booters
who make the individual booting decisions; also E, licensing and regulating booters; and F,
regulating landlords who boot under the ordinance. This first part is sometimes referred to herein
as "private profit booting". The second part under D 3 provides for City police directed booting
on public streets to enforce payment of five unpaid parking violation fines, sometimes referred to
as "police directed booting". The third part where constitutionality is not challenged herein is
under A and authorizes police officers to seize "nuisance" vehicles "wherever found" by towing
and impoundment.
7. The private profit booting and police directed booting parts of the Ordinance violate
due process because seizure of vehicles by booting is a taking of property where post seizure
procedural due process notice and hearing must be provided in the ordinance and is totally absent
in these parts of this Ordinance. See "Fuentes" v. Shevin, 92 S.Ct 1983, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556 (1972);
"Mathews" v. Eldridge 424 U. S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893,47 L Ed.2nd 19 (1976); "Sutton" v. City of
Milwaukee, 672 F. 2nd 644 (CA Wise. 1982); "Saukstelis" v. City of Chicago, 932 F 2nd 1171, C.
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A. 7 (111, 1991); "Gillam" v. Landrieu 455 F Supp. 1030, D.C. La. 1978; "Patterson" v. Cronin
650 P 2d 531 (Colo. 1982); "Wilson" v. City of New Orleans 479 So. 2d 891, (La. 1985); and
"Haefner" v. APCOA Parking Inc. et. al. N. Y.S. 2d 605, 130 Misc. 2d 203 (N. Y. 1986). Seizing
vehicles by towing and booting have the same constitutional consequences.
8. The first part purporting to legalize booting by private property owners and their
private booters (referred to hereafter for brevity as the"Ordinance"), violates due process on the
following additional independent grounds:
8.1. The private profit booting part of the Ordinance is a total "surrender" or
"abdication" of the City's control over its police power of legitimate force in the seizure of
vehicles, in that it grants to private "business licensed" booters with a private profit motive the
decision to initiate each seizure rather than vesting that decision in a government official
responsible for determining, under standards of a narrowly drawn ordinance, that seizure is
necessary and justified in each case, as required by due process. See cases cited in the previous
paragraph generally. Regarding the surrender of police power see State v. Board of Education of
Salt Lake City, 60 P. 1013 (Utah 1900). This Ordinance is a far more extreme violation of this
principal than is found in any reported case. In Fuentes, Wilson and Haefner, there was a
plausible argument, rejected by the courts, that the seizure-decision-maker was a government
official. In all other reported cases the decision-maker was a government official and they turn
on whether or not the ordinance detail provides for post-seizure due-process-conforming notice
and hearing. In this ordinance there is not even the pretext of official seizure decision-making.
The seizure decision is made by a specially business-licensed, profit-seeking, hooter, from
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who's profit-motivated decision the victim is provided no hearing or remedy. This is a pure,
unadulterated, total surrender and abdication by the City of it's police power monopoly of
legitimate force.
8.2. The Ordinance is an arbitrary, capricious and irrational due process denial in that it;
(1) allows a landlord to issue more (no limit) parking permits to tenants than the landlord has
parking spaces, often forcing tenants into illegal parking without prior notice, (2) allows total
denial of visitor parking, even for short term drop off, pickup, or business with the manager, (3)
places on tenants the burden of giving previous notice to visitors, (4) makes no requirement for
the booters, landlords, or any public office or official to maintain any record of the forceful
seizures or payment of the extorted fees, (5) only requires booters to give the victims a receipt
for the fee paid if requested and they need not even give their address, (6) is based on the false
premise that a property owner has a right to a self help remedy for every trespassing or illegal
vehicle on his premises, (7) falsely assumes that tenants' and visitors' vehicles are trespassing or
illegally on the property, when at most their vehicles might be in violation of the landlord's
private parking rules; (8) authorizes booters to impersonate police officers without uniform,
badge, or car markings, and (9) vests booters with the police power to seize vehicles in a way
that goes beyond what even the police could do.
8.3. The Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and not narrowly drawn in
that it; (1) fails to require reasonable notice to victims requiring only that landlords "post 'a'
conspicuous sign on the landlord's property", without specifying multiple postings at places
most likely to give actual notice to victims such as at entries to and from the parking lots or at the
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parking spaces, and, (2) applies initially to all "property owners" including businesses with
customer parking, and commercial fee parking but then switches the notice and regulation
provisions requirements to the limited "landlord- (student) tenant" situation (the primary
targeted victims) and is totally devoid of any notice or standards tailored to business and
commercial parking owners.
9. The private booting part of the Ordinance provides the color of authority for the
unlawful seizure of vehicles by property owner's agent booters, and thus violates the unlawful
search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment.
10. The record reveals that extensive landlord parking enforcement by booting predated
the Ordinance. The moving force that resulted in the Ordinance adoption were pleas and
complaints to the Council, police agencies, and the City and County Attorney's offices from
Utah State University students seeking relief and protection from abusive, unfair and illegal
practices of booters who were booting under the pretext of the landlords' claims to a commonlaw self-help remedy for parking violations (Ex."B" pg.l). In the end the Council betrayed the
students' pleas for relief, ignored the Deputy County Attorney's (hereafter "Linton") opinion
that it was illegal, bowed to the interests of the landlords, the booters and the police, disregarded
the constitutional limitations on their power and surrendered the police power monopoly of
legitimate force to the landlords and their booters.
11. The pretense justifying pre-ordinance common law booting was that a landlord's
booter can summarily seize vehicles on the landlords property, charge a "fee" for its services and
release the vehicle if the vehicle is violating the landlord's parking rules. As a general rule, the
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law prohibits all private citizens from settling their disputes by forceful means and commands
them to resort to the judicial process. As for governments, the Constitution invests them with the
sole title to legitimate force with constraints and inhibitions including the requirement of
providing due process of law. There is a common law exception to this general rule that allows
one who suffers a "special injury" resulting from a vehicle occupying his assigned-leased
parking stall or obstructs the entrance-exit to it, the summary "self-help" remedy of booting or
removal by towing. It is the tenant who's right to possession of the stall, not the landlord, who
suffers the "special injury" and who may invoke this extra-ordinary common law self help
remedy. The car of the landlord or another tenant could be self-help booted by the speciallyinjured tenant assigned the wrongfully-occupied stall. In this respect the Council ignored a
comment that this booting scheme violated a tenant's right to a leased parking stall (Ex. "B" pg.
8). Whether or not there is the requisite special injury that justifies self help or whether the
means employed is reasonable under the circumstances depends on the facts and circumstances
as they appear to the court from the evidence in each case. A self helper assumes the risk
inherent in going over the line. If they boot in a case where it is judicially determined that there
is no common-law "special injury", they are converting and extorting in a civil sense and at risk
of committing the criminal offenses of car theft and theft of money by extortion.
12. A few landlords in the city, apparently with legal advice, have structured both preand post-Ordinance parking control in conformity with their common law property rights. In one
case they rent stalls separate from the apartments, a possible solution where there are not
sufficient stalls for all tenants. In another case each tenant's assigned stall is posted with a notice
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for the tenant to call the booter if wrongfully occupied. There are many other alternative
solutions for landlords within the ambit of competitive free enterprise and the common law. In
private business customer parking lots (circa Eccles Theater etc.) there is no "special injury" to
the business after business hours. The "special injury" in commercial fee parking lots is the loss
of an economic opportunity. In this regard, "Janice Pearce (Council person) said she particularly
did not like the fact that the regulations interfered with private enterprise". The City Attorney
then explained that the City "wanted to bring regulation to a system that was then unregulated
and appeared to be abused" (Ex. "B" pg. 2). What resulted was that the City purported to
validate, "legalize" and give police protection to outrageously illegal, criminal, and
unconstitutional seizures and extortion practices of landlords and booters. Since the adoption of
the Ordinance the "abusers" now also hide behind the color of authority or pretext of the
Ordinance.
13. The hated abuse the City proposed to politically "regulate" by this legislation was in
fact and law, rampant, illegal, and criminal seizing of vehicles and extortion of money from
victims, committed by politically powerful landlords and their agent booters, primarily against
poor and defenseless students under the pretense of the non-extant authority of the common law.
In the legal system, the county attorney, the city attorney, and all enforcement agencies had a
duty to define the line between legitimate common-law self-help booting and theft, conversion
and extortion, and then give notice to landlords and booters as to where the line was drawn.
Then, having so given notice, prosecute the continuing landlord-booter thieves and extortionists
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with vigor. In addition, that legal line drawing should have been the basis for law enforcement
responses to victims' complaints.
14. The Council's and public attorneys' willful disregard of the students rights to freedom
from rampant theft and extortion in favor of whatever the landlords and booters wanted is clearly
exposed by the record. In the first meeting Linton opined that booting was unfair and illegal.
Then: "He said he did not agree with booting, but if it had to be done to protect landlord's
interests, there misht be room for compromise" (Ex. "B" pg. 1). The next eight meetings over
fifteen months detail how the "compromise" of students rights to freedom from this tyranny
surged far beyond compromise. It ended in the Ordinance and total capitulation, in or der to
protect the landlords interests.
15. The duty of the city and county public prosecutors to define the line between legal
common law self help booting and theft and extortion, and then give notice to and prosecute
continuing offenders was absolute and non-discretionary. This is especially true in this case
where, by the County Attorney's own record assessment; "booting was a problem and a real
public safety issue in his opinion because of the violent reactions it caused" ( Ex. "B" pg. 3). If
these public attorneys had trouble drawing the line because of the complexity of the legal
research involved or local political pressure from landlords, the Council, and others, they had a
right to shift that research opinion burden or blame to the Attorney General. But after the line
was drawn and notice was given, the local prosecutors were duty bound to curb the practices
regardless of the local political incorrectness.
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16. The legality and property-rights issues that surfaced in the first meeting were never
again raised or resolved on the record. One of the principal duties of public attorneys is to insure
by due professional diligence that proposed legislation is not in conflict with higher legal and
constitutional norms. In the performance of this sworn duty of public trust, these lawyers are
duty bound to protect the political bodies they advise from acting beyond their authority. At the
same time they protect the average citizens whose rights are otherwise at grave risk, and who pay
the public attorneys' and other officials' salaries.
17. If the public attorneys had performed their duties with even minimum due diligence
the Council would have dropped any further consideration of the private-profit booting part of
the Ordinance. In that first meeting, Council person Pearce; "wondered if booting infringed
upon personal property rights". Linton said booting "was unfair and an 'illegal lien' under state
law". Then a city attorney opined "that with the adoption of a City ordinance the issue of
illegality would be removed . . . He did not accept the premise [of the county attorney] that
booting was illegal." (Ex."B" pg. 1). The constitutionality and legality issues were clearly raised
and joined. The Council was never provided nor requested any response to those legal limitation
issues in any of the eight subsequent meetings. The two public attorneys had a duty to research
and report. If it was still "illegal" after due-diligence research, as Linton opined, he had a duty to
protect the victims, prosecute the perpetrators, advise law enforcement on proper responses to
victims complaints, and advise all concerned of the results. The assistant city attorney
"Housley", who counter-opined that even if illegal, the ordinance would make booting legal had
the same due-diligence duties to do the research, report, and act, even if the results varied from
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his first opinion, and even if he knew that was not what the Council, landlords and booters
wanted to hear. Neither attorney reported any such due-diligence findings back to the Council.
How difficult and time-consuming would due diligence research on this critical public safety
issue have been? Without conflict, all the reported cases support the allegations of this
complaint. It is not a typical gray area of the law where you find reported cases on both sides of
the issues.
16. Because these legal safeguards against abuse of political power failed, the Council
and their committee ventured off into eight more meetings of politically motivated "group
think", unrestrained by any limitations on their legal or constitutional authority. The resulting
Ordinance promoted the interests of the politically powerful landlords and booters against the
poor defenseless students under the pretext that the Council was "regulating" by legislation the
booters' admittedly abusive practices. In law and fact, rather than limit the abuses, they provided
the deceptive color of authority for the politically powerful to continue and expand their illegal
and unconstitutional seizing of the students' vehicles and extortion of their scarce money. The
council chose a course in which the victims had no practical redress. The Ordinance provided
affirmative police protection to the thieves and extorters. The record from beginning to end
expressly supports this conclusion.
17. In regard to civil rights, this record exposes a very broad aggravated and fundamental
disregard by local government officials of legal and constitutional limitations on their power
over the property rights of poor students. It appears that the only subject areas where they
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carefully observe constitutional limitations is out of fear of retaliation by the ACLU, an
organization chartered to protect First Amendment type rights but not property rights.
18. This pattern is clearly documented in the record. Council member Pearce suggested a
Council committee of students, and booters, chaired it and expanded it to also include an
apartment manager, and two apartment owners, but included no lawyers and reported back that
there was little consensus. She reported that the first way for improving the situation was
"Educating University Students" to the reality of booting. Ironically, none of the Council
members ever showed any interest in becoming educated in the "legality or illegality" of booting
though the red flag was raised. Council-person Borg "commented that all the changes to the
ordinance appeared to reflect what the booter...wanted" (Ex."B" pg. 4 ). Borg later commented
"that she hated the ordinance" (Ex. "B" pg. 5). She never asked the attorneys or anyone if there
was a legal basis for her hate. In the end she voted for both the first and revised ordinances.
Pearce in the end abstained as the chair though she voted yes on the first ordinance (Ex. "B" pg.
9) without ever having her wondering about personal property rights infringements answered
(Ex."B"pg. 1).
19. The whole record displays a willful if not wanton disregard by these public officials
(including attorneys) of their first sworn duty to "support, obey and defend Constitution of the
United States" ( Utah Const. Art. IV Sec. 10), if doing so places any limits on their authority. In
this isolated local-government environment (see Haefher), one is left to question whether the city
attorneys (appointed) would have been fired, or the county attorney (elected) been voted out if
they had held the elected officials to the legal and constitutional limits of their authority.
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20. Even though the Ordinance permits the use of violence by non-official private
persons in ways that the police cannot do, and in ways totally foreign to and offensive to and
even hated in our society, the city attorneys were bystanders in the drafting and redrafting
process. The gravity, repulsiveness and violence-inciting potential of private-profit booting
should have been a clue to all that there were serious and profound legal and constitutional
questions to be addressed and resolved before proceeding further. In effect, the County Attorney
stated that the "illegal" booting violence was inciting victim violence and fomenting a serious
public safety problem. Borg said she "hated" the ordinance. Pearce wondered if it violated
personal property rights. Other similar comments were threaded through the process (Ex."B").
Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that constitutional and illegality issues were raised and never
answered, no directions were given to the city attorney to take responsibility for the drafting or
redrafting of the proposed ordinance except for the end change requested by the council related
to landlords informing tenants (Ex. "B" pg. 9). Neither did he volunteer. It was the chief of
police who prepared and proposed the first draft according to the record. It was the chief and his
lieutenant who juggled, pulled out and stuffed in the critical parts that had profound legal
consequences. It was the police who were asked and answered the critical legal questions as the
process advanced. A city attorney was present at all meetings and appears to have been a mere
bystander as critical legal questions raced across the stage and were answered by the police.
This private-force-authorizing Ordinance as adopted has all the earmarks of a cut and paste
product of the chief of police and his lieutenant. It has none of the earmarks of an ordinance
crafted by due-diligence professional public attorneys. Apparently the Council and Mayor see
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the city attorney's limited roles as figurehead technicians. They never asked for educated,
informed answers to obvious and critical legal questions. They appear to disregard the attorneys'
legal role of defining and imposing legal and constitutional limits on the scope of the city's
authority.
21. With regard to civil rights, the record in this case documents and exposes a systemic
and fundamental flaw in the functioning of local government in this isolated community that
places in great jeopardy a broad range of constitutional and civil rights that extends far beyond
the confines of the narrow but aggravated unconstitutional booting issue, and from which the
multitudes of victims have no practical or affordable remedy.
22. There is a pathetic irony in the record where the Council, after closing their eyes and
ears to becoming "educated" in the constitutional prohibitions against legislating private profit
booting-extortion practices, nevertheless concurs in the committee report that the first solution to
the booting abuse problem is "Educating University Students" to the reality of booting (Ex. "B"
pg. 4). The prosecution of this action is a direct result of those students (many victims) repeated,
passionate and angry pleas to their law "educator", in and out of class, insisting that booting
violates their constitutional rights as taught to them in the classroom and in the text. The current
text case on due process is Mathews. Fuentes is in a former text. The "education" obtained by the
students at USU demonstrates to them that booting, as experienced by them in Logan City, is
illegal. This knowledge, coupled with the lack of a remedy for the illegal wrongs perpetrated on
them with Logan City's complicity with and protection of the thieves and extortionists, serves to
fuel the temptation to violent reactions, a danger to public safety noted by the County Attorney (
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Ex. "B" pg. 6). Restraint has become more difficult with the passage of time and no apparent,
affordable legal remedy in sight.
23. The limited relief sought in this action is a major first step in the vindication of the
constitutional rights of a very large class of victims of private-profit booting ordinances. In
addition to Logan they are in force in Provo and Orem and likely some other Utah cities. Utah
State University's booting regulation has the same basic defect in that it is not narrowly drawn to
exclude the private booter from making the decision to boot in each particular case. This option
is left open in the regulation. It does not require a police officer booting decision. If successful
this action will nullify the Ordinance and stop the unconstitutional booting now done under the
color of authority of this Ordinance. It will also provide a precedent for other court actions that
can provide remedies and damages for the multitudes of victims. It could also have the positive
effect of convincing the other violating cities and government entities to voluntarily discontinue
and repeal their unconstitutional private-profit booting ordinances.
24. The issues regarding who may be liable for damages and the kind, measure and types
of damages that the victims may be entitled to in a class action or other types of actions is
beyond the scope of this action. The justification for the damages prayed for against the City is
based upon the fact that the City has no governmental immunity under Sec. 63-30-3 UCA. That
governmental immunity act only gives cities immunity for "injury which results from the
exercise of a governmental function ". The act provides the City no immunity for an injury
which results from the total surrender or abdication of the governmental function of the use of
force to private landlords and private-profiteering booters as in this case. The justification for
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damages from the Landlord is that it has no immunity, is charged with notice of the laws he was
violating, and unlike the poor victims has the financial resources with which to get legal advice.
The same basis for liability applies to the Booter.
25. Plaintiff is still attending USU, the practice of private booting of vehicles continues,
and Plaintiff, in the course of his normal activities, is subject to being booted in the jfuture absent
the granting of the relief requested below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and demands judgment against Defendants as
follows:
1. For a declaration that the first and second parts of the Ordinance legislating private
booting, and police booting are unconstitutional, null and void, and that all licenses issued
thereunder are null and void.
2. For a permanent injunction restraining Logan City from enforcing the first two parts
the Ordinance, requiring Logan City to repeal those two parts of the ordinance, revoking hooters'
licenses and ceasing and desisting from providing police protection to landlords and booters
acting under the color of authority of the Ordinance.
3. For a permanent injunction restraining Defendant Landlord from authorizing or
ordering the booting of vehicles under the color of the authority of the Ordinance.
4. For a permanent injunction restraining Defendant Booter from booting vehicles under
the color of the authority of the Ordinance.
5. For a judgment of fifty dollars ($50.00) as compensatory damages against all
defendants, jointly and severally.
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6. For a judgment of one dollar ($1.00) in nominal damages against Defendant Logan
City.
7. For a judgment of one dollar ($1.00) in nominal damages against Defendant Landlord.
8. For a judgment of one dollar ($1.00) in nominal damages against Defendant Booter.
9. For an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1988 incurred herein. And
10. For such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
DATED September 16, 2004.

Chris Daines
Co-counsel for Plaintiff
DATED September 16, 2004.

Davixtit. Daines
Co-counsel for Plaintiff
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CITY OF LOGAN
ORDINANCE NO. 2000-75 (Revised 11/15/00)
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 10.52.040,
TO INCLUDE REGULATION OF BOOTING PRACTICES IN THE CITY OF LOGAN
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
LOGAN AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION I: Section 10.52.040, Abatement of Nuisance Vehicles - Impounding, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
10.52.040 Regulation of impounding and booting practices.
A. Every police officer of the city is authorized summarily to seize and take possession
of every abandoned or illegally parked or operated vehicle, which are declared to be
an obstruction to traffic and a nuisance, wherever found, by removing or causing such
vehicle to be removed and impounded in any authorized vehicle pound. Every police
officer of the city is also further authorized to seize and take possession of any
vehicle which is being operated upon the public streets of the city with improper
registration, or which the officer has good reason to believe has been stolen, or on
which any motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark has been
defaced, altered or obliterated, and to remove or cause such vehicle to be removed
and impounded in any authorized vehicle pound. Every police officer so impounding
a vehicle shall within twenty-four hours make a written report thereof to the chief of
police specifying the manufacturer's trade name and model of the impounded vehicle,
its license and motor number, if available, the time and place where the vehicle was
taken and impounded, and the cause of the impounding.
B. Definition:
"Booting" means to place any immobilization device upon a motor vehicle not
registered to the person placing the immobilization device for purposes of parking
enforcement.
C. Exceptions:
This section shall not apply to any parking regulations as established by a college or
university pursuant to Title 53B, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.
D. It shall be unlawful for any property owner or designee to boot any motor vehicle that
is trespassing or infringing upon the real property rights of that property owner
without complying with this section.
1. Private parking lots which contain four (4) or more parking spaces and which
use booting of vehicles for parking enforcement shall post a conspicuous sign
on the landlord's property. Such sign will provide notice, with reflective
background, that unauthorized vehicles will be booted. At a minimum,
signage shall:
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a. provide sufficient information to assist vehicle owners in the prompt
recovery of any vehicle booted;
b. be at least 12" x 18" in size.
2. After a boot is placed on any vehicle, the parking enforcement company shall:
a. provide a notice affixed to the boot or vehicle containing the name and
telephone number of the firm that placed the boot on the vehicle, as well
as the amount of the fee required to remove the boot;
b. maintain personnel authorized to remove any boot and release any vehicle
to its owner or driver upon the payment of any authorized fee except as
provided in subsection 3;
c. once payment is made, provide a receipt upon request of individual
making payment for removal of the boot.
3. The City of Logan or its designee may leave a boot in place until payment of
parking fines issued pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Section 10.52.290 are
satisfied.
a. The City of Logan or its designee may only attach a boot in accordance
with this ordinance on public property.
b. Vehicles may only be booted by the City of Logan or its designee
following (5) five written citations and a written notice for the violations.
E. Any parking enforcement company desiring to boot vehicles within Logan City shall:
Obtain a business license in the City of Logan; and register its business name,
telephone number, either an address or a P.O. Box number, and fee schedules with
Logan City. In the event of a change in business name, telephone number, address or
P.O. Box number, or fee schedules, such company shall register such information
with the Logan City Business License Department within ten (10) days.
1. Failure to comply with any provision of this section shall constitute grounds
for suspension or revocation of the business license of any company licensed
under this section to conduct parking enforcement service in Logan City.
2. A parking enforcement company shall not charge a fee in excess of any fee
listed in the fee schedule for booting a vehicle.
3. A parking enforcement company shall not charge any fee related to the
booting of a vehicle that is not listed in the fee schedule.
4. The maximum authorized fee for booting a vehicle shall be $50.00 for up to
twenty-four hours.
5. Charges for damages to booting equipment shall not be governed by this
ordinance and shall not prevent the vehicle's release if scheduled fees are
satisfied.
F. Landlords who engage a private parking enforcement company to boot illegally
parked vehicles on their property shall inform their tenants of the booting practice and
make available instructions on how to comply with the law.
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1. A parking permit shall be provided to each tenant with instructions as to
where that permit should be displayed in the automobile;
2. Tenants shall be provided with a written schedule of fees charged by the
parking enforcement company;
3. Tenants shall be provided with instructions regarding visitor parking or will
be informed if no visitor parking is available;
4. Tenants shall be provided with a method for replacing a lost permit;
landlords/managers may charge a fee for such replacement; the replacement
fee must be made known to tenants at the time they receive their parking
permits.
G. Violation of any provision of this section is a Class B Misdemeanor.
SECTION 2: Effective Date. This ordinance shall become effective upon publication.
PASSED BY THE LOGAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, STATE OF UTAH, THIS

(S -

OF HH^JHA)

2000.

Janio^Pearce, Chairman

Lois Price, City Recorder
PRESENTATION TO MAYOR
The foregoing ordinance was presented by the Logan Municipal Council to the
Mayor for approval or disapproval on the

day of _

Affilf '

2000.

/Jtr^cP^A-az.

/ <*?^SCY

Jank^JJearce, Chairman

MAYOR'S APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL
The foregoing ordinance is hereby approved this f5** day of MnA

/

Dotigfas Ii. ^Thompson
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(Civil)

PROOF OF PUBLICATION
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE

On this . Zkthay

of

personolly oppeorcd before mo

?SY£!Pk$£
J$an

A.O. . 2 0 0 0

. W l l llllOr £

w h 0 boin^

first duly sworn.

deposes end soys ihol she is the chief clork of ihc Coche Volley Publishing C o . . publishers of The Harold Journal
o daily newspaper

published in l o g o n . Cify. Cache Counfy Ulan, ond that the odvcrJiscmcnJ

LEGAL NOTICE
LEGAL NOTICE
SUMMARIES or ordinances adopted by the
Logan Municfpaf Council are as follows:
1. ORD. 00-75 REVISED. An ordinance
o copy of which is h e r e t o attached, was published in soid was adopted October
18, 2000 amending
Logan Municipal Code,
1989 to include Section
ac^ipopcr lac
One..( L ) . . . i«s sue
10.52.040, "Regulation
of Impounding and
commencing . . JJo.Vejub^r. . 2 4 > . 2QQfid Booting Practices." It
was amended November 15, 2000 to clarify
b
ending
¥ P T £ ? . . ? F . . Z/tj.. ? 0 0 0 ^
language. Also, subsection "F" was added
dealing with landlords
Signed . t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J . . . ix^JdLL
(frit&Jr? who engage a private
parking enforcement
company to boot illegalSubscrjl>ea ond sworn to before mo. the doy ond year ly parked vehicles on
their property. They are
required to inform tenobovc written.
ants of the booting
practice and make
available instruction on
Signed
how to comply the law
N o t a r y Public.
by providing:
A. Permits and instrucas to where to disMy Commiuion expires . . . § e p j t e m b e r . .7». 2Q03.. tions
play them;
B. Written schedule of
fees charged by parking enforcement company;
C. Instructions regarding visitor parking or will
be informed if none is
available,
D. Method of replacing
lost permit.
'~-'
'.1. H ^
Violation of the ordinance section is a
Class B Misdemeanor
'JO/
-003
2, ORD. 00-88. An ordinance was adopted
November 15, 2000 to
amend
Section
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6.12.180, "Dogs Running at Large" to include other animals as
weff as dogs. The
amendment provides
that it shall be the absolute responsibility of
those who keep dogs
or other animals to
prevent them from running at large in the city.
It stipulates that it is unlawful for any person to
own, harbor or keep
dogs or other animals
which run at large in
the city or to permit
dogs or other animals
to run at large.
3. ORD. 00-85. An ordinance was adopted
November 1, 2000, vacating a certain right-ofway located south of
Golf Course Road at
100 West and d e scribed as follows:
Located in Block 3, Plat
H
B" of the Providence
Farm Survey. The City
wishes to abandon all
of the "Old Field Road"
right-of-way on Parcel
02-064-0014,
as
recorded in the Cache
County Recorder's Office as Entry 608/60,
and Parcel 02-0640009, as recorded in
the Cache County
Recorder's Office as
Entry 498/987
Also a part of the "Old
Field Road" right-ofway that will not be
used as the new 100
West Street, on Parcel
02-085-0001,
as
recorded in the Cache
County Recorder's Office as Entry 792-624

This ordinance is cc
gent on the dedic
of all rights-of-way
essary for the rea
ment of the n e w
West Street, inck
sidewalks and p a
strips to City Stands
These ordinances
become effective
publication.
Full text of these
nances may be
viewed at the Offi
the
Logan
Recorder, City Hall
North Main, Logai
during regular c
hours.
Lois Price, Record€
Publication Date:
November 24, 2 0 0

(U)

Lo

&m Municipal Council

Logan, Utah

August 4,1999

Vehicle Booting Ordinance - 99-83
Police Chief Rich Hendricks introduced an ordinance which, if passed, would regulate
vehicle booting practices in the City, in public and private parking lots, with the exception of
university parking lots, A "boot" is a lock attached to the wheel of a vehicle, immobilizing it.
Janice Pearce wondered if the ordinance infringed upon personal property rights. Chief
Hendricks explained booting was going on in the City and needed to be regulated. "We receive
complaints about it and need a level of consistency," he said. The ordinance was proposed as a
starting point for the Council, Hendricks added. He mentioned some issues to discuss were:
booting of public and private lots; signage and size of signs; providing receipts for payment; and
maximum fees. Among issues not addressed in the ordinance were requiring booting businesses to
accept checks and credit cards, and length of time boot could remain on the vehicle.
Karen Borg supported limiting the public use of booting. "I don't like this kind of tool
being used in behalf of the City," she said.
Attorney Don Linton of the County Attorney's Office spoke about hisfrustrationswith
booting, which he said was unfair and an "illegal lien" under state law. He said tow was permitted
by State law, but the practice of booting was not specifically allowed under State law. Attorney
Linton said the County Attorney's Office was inundated with complaints from those whose
vehicles had been booted. He supported an, ordinance but said he was not sure he liked the one
proposed. He said he did not agree with booting, but if it had to be done to protect landlord's
interests, there might be room for compromise.
Attorney H o u s e s opinion was that with adoption of a City ordinance the issue of
illegality would be removed. He did not accept the premise that booting was illegal, since if a sign
was posted, those who parked in the lot had been put on notice. The City, he said, wanted to
protect consumers by setting standards for footing.
Karen Borg suggested rescheduling this many-sided problem for discussion at a workshop.
Brady Pearce, owner of Cache Valley Booting Service, said he had been in business since
1994, booting vehicles for owners of student rentals. He said signs were posted in the parking lots
he worked in. He talked about the hardship imposed if the maximum fee for his services was $40.
He spoke about what he did not like about the proposed ordinance.
Randy Weston, owner of Old Farm, student housing apartments located east of Romney
Stadium, spoke in support of the booting service. He said booting was the best answer he had
found to bad parking problems at student apartments. "We simply are trying to deal with the
problem of keeping those who don't belong in our parking lot out of it. . .Without him (the
booting service) we are back to square one... towing."
Ryan Dent, past ASUSU President, asked for more time to review the ordinance.
Discussion centered around difficult situations and confrontations between students and Mr.
Pierce.
The Council decided to discuss the ordinance again at its August 25 meeting and asked for
public comment prior to the meeting.
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LoganMunicipal Council

Logan, Utah

August 25,1999

VEHICLE BOOTING ORDINANCE. Chairman Thompson opened the meeting to
discussion of a proposed vehicle booting ordinance for public and private parking control and said
minimal public comment would be accepted. Janice Pearce and John Harder did not see a need for
the ordinance. Karen Borg and Alan Allred supported an ordinance of sonie type. Janice Pearce
said she particularly did not like the fact that the regulations interfered with private enterprise.
Karen Borg wanted to eliminate the use of this enforcement tool in public parking areas. She
said it was "heavy-handed"
Attorney Mark Sorenson explained the administration wanted to bring reasonable
regulation to a system that was now unregulated and appeared to be abused.
There was discussion about setting a maximum fee which could be charged by the booter.
Karen Borg thought $40 might be too high.
Craig Davis of Clancy, the City's public parking lot enforcement contractor, said the
ordinance was a necessary tool in public parking lots to control habitual parking violators.
Shawn Sorenson said he had managed apartments for years. He talked about why booting
was done and the difficulty in managing parking at apartments. His experience was that booting
was effective and the ordinance was not needed.
John Harder was excused at 8:30 p.m. for another appointment.
Vince Larsen of AFs Trophies, said Clancy did an "outstanding" job of parking
management in the Centerblock parking lot. He did not like the idea of booting vehicles in that
city-owned lot.
Ryan Dent, past ASUSU President, supported the ordinance. He believed details needed
to be worked out but booting needed to be regulated for consistency.
Quentin Casperson said booting in the Centerblock public parking lot would be detrimental
to downtown business.
The Council agreed that more discussion needed to take place on the ordinance and
scheduled it as a workshop item on the September 1 meeting agenda.
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Logan Municipal Coundl

Logan, Utah

September 1,1999

DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED VEHICLE BOOTING ORDINANCE.
There was a lengthy discussion about the proposed vehicle booting ordinance.
Karen Borg said she was convinced an ordinance was needed but did not support booting
as a public parking enforcement tool, except to have some leverage over repeat violators, and she
favored establishing a dollar level at which this type of enforcement would be permitted.
Chairman Thompson allowed County Attorney Scott Wyatt to comment on the issue. He
said booting was a problem and a real public safety issue in his opinion because of the violent
reactions it caused. For that reason, he supported limited booting after a certain number of
warnings. He suggested the city's contract parking authority might, upon, request, write tickets
in private parking lots as warnings. He commented about signage and said he did not think a sign
could be required that was large enough to warn someone who parked improperly in a private lot
after 11 p.m. that their vehicle might be booted. Councilmember Allred spoke about his concerns
relating to Attorney Wyatt's suggestions, pointing out that landlords had emphasized the need for
the booting service to control parking in their lots. It was mentioned during the discussion that
not booting also represented a security risk to those students who must park away from their
premises because the stalls were occupied by non-residents.
Councilmember Allred said he could support booting in public parking lots after a
designated number of tickets had been issued and not paid. Discussion centered around what
individual Councilmembers saw as problems with the ordinance and suggestions for changes were
made. A majority supported: (1) Adding an exception that booting would not be used on public
streets or public parking lots until five tickets were issued and not paid; (2) Eliminating
requirement for booter to notify the Police Department when vehicles were booted; (3) Minimum
size of signs posted at private parking lots regarding booting be 12Mxl8M; (4) All private parking
lots using booting would be required to post conspicuous signage; (5) Booting company would
not be required to have the business location printed on the notice affixed to the booted vehicle;
(6) Maximum fee for booting a vehicle would not be regulated. Councilmember Borg asked that
it be noted that she was not part of the majority agreeing to the foregoing. Neither was Chairman
Thompson.
Councilmember Borg said she would not vote for an ordinance without stipulation of a
maximum fee for booting a vehicle. Councilmembers Harder and Pearce did not feel an ordinance
was necessary. Chairman Thompson encouraged members of the audience to contact
Councilmembers about proposed changes He scheduled the ordinance for the September 22
agenda,
Janice Pearce suggested a committee of students, City Council, and booting company
representatives meet. Councilmember Pearce was asked by Chairman Thompson to chair the
committee. He asked to be invited to the meeting. Mayor Thompson commented that the
administration had worked for several months in an attempt to mediate this situation among the
various parties but had not been able to find common ground.
It was agreed to defer action on the proposed ordinance until a report was received from
Councilmembers Pearce and Thompson
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Logan Municipal Council

Logan, Utah

January 19,2000

VEHICLE BOOTING ORDINANCE DISCUSSION.
Councilmember Pearce distributed a report and copies of three vehicle booting ordinance
proposals. She reported the committee, comprised of USU studentbody leaders, an apartment
manager, two apartment owners, and the manager of the local booting service, had met three
times in the past three months. She said although little consensus was achieved through these
meetings, they were useful in providing a forum for identifying and discussing vehicle booting
issues and practices and attempting to negotiate acceptable solutions. The report identified five
ways the situation could be improved:
1. Educating University Students. Better dissemination of information regarding booting. Also,
apartment owners should inform tenants in writing about parking lot regulations, including the use
booting practices and fees.
2. Costs. To address the issue offluctuatingcharges by the booter, charges could be posted,
publicized and applied in a fair, consistent manner.
3. Cash requirement. The booter had required cash payment to remove boots from vehicles,a
difficult requirement for students after banking hours and at night. Encouraging the booter to
accept credit cards could alleviate this problem.
4. Short-term parking. Encouraging apartment owners to have ten-minute loading zones in
parking lots was suggested as one way to alleviate problems.
The committee concluded that control should be based on education and information,
individual responsibility, and fair and equitable application of any ordinance which was adopted.
Chairman Pearce carefully reviewed the proposed City Code amendment to Section
10.52.040, Regulation of impounding and booting practices. Police Lt. L. R. Earl addressed
questions.
Fees and vehicle booting signs in parking lots were discussed. It was agreed that 12x18
inch signs were sufficient. No consensus was reached on minimum booting fees. Students
supported $25; one ordinance proposed $40; the booter wanted $50 minimum.
Karen Borg commented that all changes to the ordinance appeared to reflect what the
booter, Brady Pierce wanted. It appeared to her that the student concern was mainly fees and to
lower the minimum would be one concession to them.
After -further discussion, it was decided to schedule the matter for the Council workshop
agenda on February 2. Public comment on the vehicle booting ordinance would be accepted
during the time allotted for discussion.
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Logan Municipal Council

Logan, Utah

February 2,2000

Vehicle Booting Ordinance discussion with public comment.
Chairman Thompson opened the meeting to limited public comment on legislation
regarding vehicle booting in private and public parking areas.
Nate Anderson, ASUSU Studentbody President, reminded the Council that students had
requested the ordinance reflect the following: (1) Requirement that the booter accept an
alternative payment to cash; (2) posting of clearly visible signage regarding booting; (3) requiring
printed receipts of the booter; (4) posted fee schedule, registered with the City.
Brady Pierce said his company gave receipts. He objected to being required to accept
checks and talked about problems with accepting credit cards. He was not opposed to having
fees posted. In his opinion, his present fees were fair. Requiring $40 maximum fee would put him
out of business, he said. Mr. Pierce did not think towing cars was a solution to congested
apartment complex parking lots. He mentioned that he did not often resort to towing.
Karen Borg's comment was that she hated the ordinance.
Janice Pearce, Chair of the Review Committee said she would provide to Councilmembers
booting feesfromfivecities. She said most charged $40, but towed many more vehicles.
Randy Weston, large apartment complex owner, had contracted with Mr. Brady for
booting services for the pastfiveyears. He said he had tried everything to manage parking, and
booting was the best solution to discourage peoplefromparking vehicles where they did not
belong. He said there was no possibility of providing any visitor parking in his student apartment
lots because parking was so limited, but temporary permits could be obtained from on-site
managers.
Chairman Thompson closed the public comment portion of the meeting.
Councilmember Pearce asked Rich Hendricks for comments. The suggestion was made to
allow vehicle owners a reasonable time to pay after the boot was placed on the vehicle prior to
towing. Chief Hendricks pointed out that towing vehicles was not an alternative for either the
Parking Authority or the Police Department.
Nate Anderson restated the four hems he requested on behalf of the students.
Alan Allred did not think the City could legislate the form of payment the booter would
accept.
Chairman Thompson thanked Janice Pearce for work on this issue and her report. The
Council agreed to discuss the proposed legislation once more at a future meeting.
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Logan Municipal Council

Logan, Utah

February 16,2000

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. Booting Ordinance. Councilmember Pearce continues to work
on an ordinance draft to bring to the Council.
&H

Logan Municipal Council

Lo gan , Utah

October 4,2000

Vehicle booting ordinance.
Chairman Pearce explained many months had been spent deliberating a motor vehicle
booting ordinance. Chief Hendricks explained the changes to the ordinance. Booting, in general,
was discussed. He spoke about the huge amount of unpaid parkingfinessome people
accumulate. He said booting is just one tool to help remedy the situation and get people to pay
their parking fines.
Councilmember Borg questioned booting on private versus public property. Chief
Hendricks said this concern is covered in other City ordinances. The proposed $40 fee was
discussed. Mayor Thompson suggested a warning letter be part of the process. After further
discussion, it was agreed to place the ordinance on the October 18 agenda for action.
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Logan Municipal Council

Logan, Utah

October 18,2000

Vehicle Booting Ordinance - Ordinance adopting regulations for motor vehicle
impounding and booting practices in the City - 00-75 Revised,
Chairman Pearce talked about the history of this long-discussed and debated ordinance
and distributed past information. She gave the Council copies of booting rates from other cities
in the State, as well as the current fee schedule of Cache Auto Booting. She said there were not
many difference in the ordinance ^efore them and the one received from the booting
subcommittee which she-chaired. She pointed out Chief Hendricks had deleted a section
requiring submission of information to the police department by a person booting motor vehicles.
Councilmember Kerr thought the ordinance was confusing about where signs would be
posted and suggested a change in wording, Councilmember Borg did not want any conflict with
the sign ordinance. It was agreed that the ordinance should indicate signs would be placed "on
the property."
Discussion centered around sigaageand-notification-and what was-considered "sufficient
information to assist vehicle owners in the prompt recovery of any vehicle booted." Chief
Hendricks thought the hooter's phone number should be on the sign. Brady Pierce of Cache
Auto Booting brought in a sign for the Council to see and discussed the practices of his company
for notification after booting a vehicle. The Council agreed that a phone number should be
included on the sign. Mr. Pierce had not seen the revised ordinance and did not know how it
differed from the previous one.
Councilmember Thompson asked about towing. Mr. Pierce said the towing fee allowed
by State law is $80 per hour. Police Chief Hendricks talked about the formula established by
State Statute putting this cap of $80 per hour on towing companies. Discussion then centered
around the cost for booting. Chief Hendricks says towing is significantly more complicated and
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cost prohibitive than booting. He discouraged the Council from trying to implement a per hour
charge. Mr Pierce talked about his booting practice. The time element is in checking complexes
and locating improperly parked cars. He confirmed that he gets paid only when he removes a
boot. He talked about the income he brings in on a daily basis, which he said is not very much
per day. His present rate is $50 for non-resident motorists.
Slade Derr of ASUSU asked to present student interests. He says this is a big issue for
students, particularly in four areas: (1) Need for temporary parking for short visits. He suggested
a 15-minute mandatory time the booter would have to wait before booting the car. (2) Signs
warning that booting will take place to be placed at the entrances to parking lots. (3) Low fee.
They would like less but are comfortable with a $40-$50 level. (4) Booter to be required to take
credit card and check payments. (Some students feel they are placed in a harmful situation at
night if they have to go to ATM's to get cash for payment.) Mr. Derr said this is the top student
priority request for amendment.
There was discussion on forms of payment. The Council did not support telling a private
business which form of payment it could take. As a compromise, Councilmember Borg
supported disallowing any additional charge by the booter for leaving the booted car in the lot for
up to 24 hours. The problems this would create were discussed.
Mr. Derr asked that the Council take the student perspective into consideration. He
thanked them for considering an ordinance that would put limitations on the booting practice.
Chief Hendricks urged the Council to pass an ordinance that will facilitate more service
providers. If this was done, then students could encourage apartment owners to make changes.
Councilmember Borg suggested to Mr. Piqrce that he take credit cards and checks and the
City would remove the cap on the fee. The problems this would create were discussed.
Steve Bower said he did not like the booting ordinance. He talked about the contract for
parking between the tenant and the property owner, which means to him that the tenant has also
"leased" a parking space. Also, he did not think he should be "held hostage" for unpaid parking
tickets after the ordinance is passed.
Mr. Bower then clarified an earlier comment he made about Nevin Limburg not meeting
with him. He said in the past Nevin had been "more than happy" to talk to him but had not
responded to a request for information prior to this meeting.
Brian Baer, a USU student, said he has been victim of booting. His opinion was that
booting should be strongly regulated. He asked the Council to lower the fee and require the
booter to accept all forms of payment. Also, he asked that signs in parking lots be reflective and
posted on City property.
Ryan Burleson said he is manager of an apartment complex and also a student. He
supported booting and said it was successful in controlling parking in the complex. He thought
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students should take personal responsibility for where they park. He asked that no cap be put on
the fee for booting.
Councilmember Kerr proposed a motion to amend the fee from $40 to $50 maximum,
leaving other fees to the provider. It was decided to vote after all amendments had been agreed
upon. Councilmember Kerr withdrew his motion.
Potential additional fees were discussed. Chief Hendricks discouraged the Council from
considering any additional fees regulating such things as abusive customers. Councilmember
Borg proposed an amendment to section E(4): "The maximum authorized fee for booting a
vehicle shall be $50 for up to either 36 or 48 hours." This was discussed. It was decided not to
make this amendment. There was discussion about Mr. Pierce's fee schedule. The Council
concurred on a maximum fee for booting of $50. The following amendments were agreed upon:
1.
2.
3.
4.

D(l) " . . . Such signage will provide notice in large lettering with reflective background..."
D(3)(a). "The City or its designee shall boot only on public property.
D(3)(b). "Booting will take place, with written warning, after thefifthcitation."
E(4). "The maximum fee for booting a vehicle shall be $50.00 for up to 24 hours."

Chief Hendricks suggested removing "up to 24 hours." from amendment 4. After
discussion, the Council agreed. It was also agreed that other problems dealing with booting, such
as damages, are separate issues, and the booter will have to make the decision whether or not to
pursue through the court system.
ACTION. Motion by Councilmember Borg, seconded by Councilmember Kerr to adopt
Ord. 00-75 as amended above. Motion carried 4-1, S. Thompson voting no.
Karen S. Borg, voted yes
Tom Kerr, voted yes
Janice Pearce, voted yes
Alan D. Alfred, voted yes
Stephen C. Thompson, voted no
Logan Municipal Council
Logan, Utah
November 15, 2000
Review of finalized language for Ord. 00-75, Vehicle Booting.
City Attorney Mark Sorenson reviewed changes in language to the Booting Ordinance
which had been adopted October 18. The changes had been made by Police Chief Hendricks to
clarify Council intent. Since the ordinance had been published, Attorney Sorenson wanted to
review the changes with the Council and have the ordinance republished. Section F was added
requiring landlords who engage a private parking enforcement company to boot illegally parked
vehicles on their property to inform their tenants and make instructions available on how to
comolv with the law.
After discussion, the Council agreed to the changes. There was also consensus to
remove the requirement that the parking enforcement company provide its address on the notice
affixed to the booted vehicle. Name, telephone number and fee amount are required to be placed
on the notice.
ACTION. Motion by Councilmember Alfred, seconded by Councilmember Kerr to
adopt Ordinance 00-75 Revised 11/15/00. Motion carried unanimously.
Karen S. Borg, voted yes
Tom Kerr, voted yes
Janice Pearce, chair, did not vote
AlanD. Alfred, voted yes
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Tab 2

Chris Daines, Bar # 0800
David R. Daines, Bar # 0801
CHRIS DAINES LAW
135 North Main, Suite 108
Logan, Utah 84321
Phone: (435)752-1750 Fax: 753-1950
Attorneys for Plaintiff

°

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

QUINN MILLET,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF QUINN MILLET

LOGAN CITY, DS BRIDGERLAND
APARTMENTS, INC., and CACHE AUTO
BOOTING SERVICE,
Defendants.

Judge Gordon J. Low

Case No. 040101921

State of Utah

)
) ss.
County of Cache)
QUINN MILLET, the Plaintiff in the above action, being first duly sworn on oath
deposes and says:
1. That on the 10th day of September, 2003, my car was booted by Defendant, Cache
Auto Booting Service ("Booter"), while parked in the parking lot of the Bridgerland Apartments,
owned by Defendant Ds Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. located in Logan City, Utah.
2. The Booter demanded a payment of FIFTY DOLLARS ($50.00) in cash for the
release of the boot. I paid the FIFTY DOLLARS ($50.00) in cash as demanded. In return, the
Booter provided me an unsigned written memo acknowledging my payment called a "Receipt", a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit A, and released the boot.
to

1*1

3. I wrote a demand for the return of my FIFTY DOLLARS ($50.00) on the grounds
that the booting was unconstitutional. A copy of that demand is attached as Exhibit B.
4. The Booter sent me the letter dated March 13, 2004, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit C, together with a copy of the Logan City Booting Ordinance enclosed, explaining why
he considered his booting me to be legal and constitutional.
DATED March2£, 2005.

Quinn Millet
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on March2#, 2005.
HOLLYA.HAUETER

NOTARY PUBUC-STATE Of UTAH

135 H MAW SITOEJ SUOT JOB
LOGAN UTW321
My Comm. Exp. (S/1Q/200&

<ZLU2M<LJ

/SD

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On March 2h, 2005,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing to:
Miles P. Jensen
OLSON & HOGGAN
88 West Center
Logan, UT 84321
Kevin J. Fife
OLSON & HOGGAN
88 West Center
Logan, UT 84321
David L. Church
BLAISDELL & CHURCH
5995 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
Kymber Housley
Logan City Attorney
255 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
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Quinn Millet
954 North 600 East #21
Logan, UT 84321
March 2 n d , 2004
Ronald & Hollie Liechty
Cache Auto Booting Services
175 East Center Street
Providence, UT 84332
James B. Anderson
D's Bridgerland Apartments
3276 South 250 West
Nibley,UT 84321
James B. Anderson
D's Bridgerland Apartments
76 West 2400 North, Box 3448
Logan, UT 84343

Dear Cache Auto Booting Service and D's Bridgerland Apartments:

My name is Quinn Millet. I am a resident at D's Bridgerland Apartments and my
car was "booted" on 9/10/03. I have thought/researched the actions that you have taken
towards me and I have even gone to the point of reading the ordinance pertaining to
booting. Now, even more than before, I feel that you violated my right to due process
and my rights (4th amendment/ 14th amendment) by the unreasonable seizure of my car
and the taking of my fifty dollars. I would like to be reimbursed for the money taken
from me ($ 50.00). I am also asking that you discontinue this illegal / blatant /
inflammatory violation of civil rights by discontinuing your "booting" activities
altogether and indefinitely. If you fail to pay me this money (that you have illegally
taken from me and fail to make a written promise to discontinue "booting") I will take
legal action against you. I expect a written response within 7 days. If I don't receive a
written response I will assume that you fully agree with my position and that my fifty
dollars is forthcoming.
Please send both items to the above address.
'D'
Sincere!

uinn Millet

/S3

Cache
Auto
Services

Booting

S u f ^

March 13,2004
Mr. Quinn Miflet
954 North 600 East #21
Logan, UT 84321
Dear Sin
In response to your letter dated March 2, 2004, I Ron Liechty, President of Cache Auto Booting
Services wish to inform you of the following facts:
1.

Booting practices are completely legal as defined by Logan City Ordinance 10.52.040. See
attached copy of ordinance.

2.

We have a valid license in Logan City to do business.

3. We have a contract with D's Bridgerland Apartments to patrol and enforce parking in their
parking lot.
4.

Your reference to your "civil rights" do not apply to what you do on someone elses' private
property. It is the property owners'rightto protect their property. This includes enforcement of
parking rules.

As the date you referred to was over 5 months ago, it is difficult to re-create what exactly happened. If
you could produce a receipt from our company we may be able to better determine what the facts are.
The receipt will have the License plate # of the booted vehicle as well as the date the fine was
collected. As a practice these receipts are given to evetyone paying a boot fine. We also need to see
a copy of your residential contract and the vehicle registration.

Sincerely,

Ronald S. Liechty
President - Cache Auto Booting Service
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10.52.040 Regulation Of Impounding And Booting Practices:
A. Authorization To Impound Vehicles: Every police officer of the city is authorized summarily
to seize and take possession of every abandoned or illegally parked or operated vehicle,
which is declared to be an obstruction to traffic and a nuisance, wherever found, by
removing or causing such vehicle to be removed and impounded in any authorized vehicle
pound. Every police officer of the city is also further authorized to seize and take
possession of any vehicle which is being operated upon the public streets of the city with
improper registration, or which the officer has good reason to believe has been stolen, or
on which any motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark has been
defaced, altered or obliterated, and to remove or cause such vehicle to be removed and
impounded in any authorized vehicle pound. Every police officer so impounding a vehicle
shall within twenty four (24) hours make a written report thereof to the chief of police
specifying the manufacturer's trade name and model of the impounded vehicle, its license
and motor number, if available, the time and place where the vehicle was taken and
impounded, and the cause of the impounding.
B. Definition: I!Bootiag-n^means to place any immobilization device upon a motor vehicle not
registered to the person placing the immobilization device for purposes of parking
enforcement.
C. Exceptions: This section shall not apply to any parking regulations as established by a
college or university pursuant to title 53B, chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated.
D. Booting Of Vehicles: It shall be unlawful for any property owner or designee to boot any
motor vehicle that is trespassing or infringing upon the real property rights of that property
owner without complying with this section.
1. Private parking lots which contain four (4) or more parking spaces and which use booting
of vehicles for parking enforcement shall post a conspicuous sign on the landlord's
property. Such sign will provide notice, with reflective background, that unauthorized
vehicles will be booted. At a minimum, signage shall:
a. Provide sufficient information to assist vehicle owners in the prompt recovery of any
vehicle booted;
b. Be at least twelve inches by eighteen inches (12" x 18") in size.
2. After a boot is placed on any vehicle, the parking enforcement company shall:
a. Provide a notice affixed to the boot or vehicle containing the name and telephone
number of the firm that placed the boot on the vehicle, as well as the amount of the fee
required to remove the boot;
b. Maintain personnel authorized to remove any boot and release any vehicle to its
owner or driver upon the payment of any authorized fee except as provided in subsection
D3 of this section;
c. Once payment is made, provide a receipt upon request of individual making payment
for removal of the boot.
http://66.113.195.234/UT/Logan/l 1013000000004000.htm

JST

3/11/2004

IW.^^.V/

• VT X V V ^ V * 4 M H V X A

V ^ A XXXAJpVH^J.i.VJ.AXX^> J. KXXVi. JU» WV*f UJULlg X l C I V ^ l l V ^ O .

X~<1££C . Z O I

.}

3. The city of Logan or its designee may leave a boot in place until payment of parking fines
issued pursuant to section 10.52.290 of this chapter are satisfied.
a. The city of Logan or its designee may only attach a boot in accordance with this
section on public property.
b. Vehicles may only be booted by the city of Logan or its designee following five (5)
written citations and a written notice for the violations.
E. License Requirements; Fees: Any parking enforcement company desiring to boot vehicles
within Logan City shall:
Obtain a business license in the city of Logan; and register its business name, telephone
number, either an address or a PO box number, and fee schedules with Logan City. In the
event of a change in business name, telephone number, address or PO box number, or fee
schedules, such company shall register such information with the Logan City business
license department within ten (10) days.
1. Failure to comply with any provision of this section shall constitute grounds for
suspension or revocation of the business license of any company licensed under this
section to conduct parking enforcement service in Logan City.
2. A parking enforcement company shall not charge a fee in excess of any fee listed in the
fee schedule for booting a vehicle.
3. A parking enforcement company shall not charge any fee related to the booting of a
vehicle that is not listed in the fee schedule.
4. The maximum authorized fee for booting a vehicle shall be fifty dollars ($50.00) for up to
twenty four (24) hours.
5. Charges for damages to booting equipment shall not be governed by this section and
shall not prevent the vehicle's release if scheduled fees are satisfied.
F. Private Parking Enforcement: Landlords who engage a private parking enforcement
company to boot illegally parked vehicles on their property shall inform their tenants of the
booting practice and make available instructions on how to comply with the law.
1. A parking permit shall be provided to each tenant with instructions as to where that
permit should be displayed in the automobile;
2. Tenants shall be provided with a written schedule of fees charged by the parking
enforcement company;
3. Tenants shall be provided with instructions regarding visitor parking or will be informed if
no visitor parking is available;
4. Tenants shall be provided with a method for replacing a lost permit; landlords/managers
may charge a fee for such replacement; the replacement fee must be made known to
tenants at the time they receive their parking permits.

http://66.113.195.234/UT/Logan/l 1013000000004000.htm
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

QUINN MILLET,

*
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

LOGAN CITY, D'S BRIDGERLAND
APARTMENTS, INC., and CACHE
AUTO BOOTING SERVICE,

*

Defendants.

*

Case No.

040101921

Judge: Gordon J. Low

*

THE ABOVE MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to three motions, (1) the
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (2) Defendants D's Bridgerland Apartments,
Inc. and Cache Auto Booting Service's Motion to Dismiss, and (3) Defendant Logan City's
Motion to Dismiss. Following Plaintiffs Complaint and Defendant Logan City's Answer,
Defendants' D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. and Cache Auto Booting Service's filed its
Motion to Dismiss and a supporting memorandum. Plaintiff responded by memorandum in
opposition and Defendants' D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. and Cache Auto Booting Service's
filed a reply memorandum. The Court originally heard oral arguments on January 28, 2005, in
regards to Defendants D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. and Cache Auto Booting Service's
Motion to Dismiss and the parties stipulated to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file a motion for
summary judgment and supporting memorandum, adjusting the procedural motions to allow
Defendant Logan City the ability to address the merits of Plaintiff s claim as it pertains to Logan

/

,?o
3.o7

7

City's Ordinance No. 2000-75 (the "Ordinance"). The parties then were allowed permissible
time to respond and additional oral arguments were held May 18, 2005, following a full briefing
of the issues by the parties. In preparation of its decision, the Court has reviewed each motion,
memoranda, document, affidavit, the relevant case law, and applicable statutory provisions.
Background
The following germane facts are undisputed. The Plaintiff entered a lease agreement (the
"Lease") with Defendant D's Bridgerland Apartments (the "Landlord") on August 22, 2003.
Then, on September 10, 2003, Defendant Cache Auto Booting Service (the "Booter")
immobilized Plaintiff vehicle's by booting. The Booter has an ongoing contract with the
Landlord to enforce the Landlord's parking lot restrictions. The Plaintiff paid a $50.00 fee to
have his vehicle released from the boot and filed this claim, alleging the Ordinance
unconstitutionally violated his Due Process Rights under the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution and in violation of 42
U.S.C.A. 1983.
Arguments
The Complaint initially asserts that the creation of the Ordinance constituted a surrender
or abdication of the Defendant Logan City's (hereafter, the "City") control over its police power
regarding the seizure of vehicles because the Ordinance grants to private businesses and licensed
booters the power to initiate each seizure without a procedural due process safeguard, a predeprivation hearing by a neutral official The Complaint references Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972) and its selected progeny, namely, Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Sutton v.
City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2nd 644 (CA Wise. 1982, Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2nd
2
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1171 (111. 1991), Gillam v. Landrieu, 455 F.Supp. 1030 (D.C. La. 1978), Patterson v. Cronin,
650 P.2d 531 (Colo. 1982), Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So.2d 891 (La. 1985), and
Haefner v. APCOA Parking Inc. et. al, 500 N.Y.S. 2d 605 (N.Y. 1986), openly acknowledging
the deprivation of personal property by towing is synonymous to booting. Of particular concern
to the Plaintiff is the potential for abusive parking enforcement by private, licensed booting
companies seeking a profit.
The Plaintiffs Complaint also states constitutional issues. To Plaintiff, the Ordinance is
unconstitutionally problematic in that it is arbitrary, capricious and an irrational due process
denial because it allows landlords the ability to issue numerous parking permits, exceeding their
numbered tenant parking spaces. Plaintiff argues the Ordinance unjustly allows landlords or their
booters the ability to boot short term drop-off situations absent any enforcement records, so long
as a nondescript receipt, without the hooter's address, is given. Further, Plaintiff professes the
Ordinance is vague in that it requires a sign as notice of potential booting in landlord/tenant
situations but is unclear on other projected property owners with four or more parking stalls.
Plaintiff asserts that at common law, the tenant's right to a leased parking stall affords him and
not the Landlord a self-help remedy because the actions taken against the Plaintiff constitute a
special injury, by way of an analogy, similar to an extortion or an illegal lien. Lastly, Plaintiff
argues the Ordinance exceeds local government constitutional limitations.
Asserting the Complaint is improper, the Landlord and Booter claims together in their
Motion to Dismiss, that no state action occurred to trigger 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, because only
private parties are involved. The Defendants then references Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 939 (1982) and Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) to support the claim that the
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complaint fails to state an action upon which relief can be granted because the action by a private
party pursuant to a law is "not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party as a 'state
actor."' Defendants states that the grounds for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction is not established because no irreparable harm is found, the balancing of interest
weighs in favor of the private landlord and booter, and public interest supports the practice of
private landlords enforcing their parking lots. Lastly, the Defendants Landlord and Booter assert,
even if they are found to be defacto state actors, the applicable statute of limitation, U.C.A. §7812-29 excludes both the Landlord and Booter from liability when Plaintiff failed to file within
one year from the injury.
Retorting, the Plaintiff presents the argument that the Ordinance is unconstitutional
because a "special injury" is seen in this case. The Plaintiff also professes that Lugar and Wyatt
support the premise that an action under the color of state law is equivalent to a state action under
42 U.S.C.A. §1983. According to Plaintiff, the Landlord and Booter are acting under the color of
state law because the Ordinance abdicates by regulation the enforcement of landlord/tenant
parking lots. Plaintiff contends it is the victim which lacks a complete remedy at law because he
is deprived of personal property, without any possibility to inject a plausible defense by a private
booter who does not even have to identify themselves or their company/business license, unlike
the university booting policies. Because Plaintiff is student and continually subject to the
practice of various landlord booting, Plaintiff believes an injunction is needed.
In reply, Defendant Landlord and Defendant Booter assert the booting of Plaintiff s
vehicle did not constitute a state action because it was conducted by purely private parties. The
Defendants suggest that Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416
4

JD I O

U.S. 600 (1974) correctly characterized Fuentes as now requiring notice and hearing only when
an adversary procedure was not available and a state official is jointly acting along with the
private party. The Landlord and Booter also allege distinguishable factors in Fuentes and Lugar
from the Plaintiffs booting situation, stating in the replevin cases the state action was evidenced
by an ex parte petition, a court's issuance of a writ and the executive branch's execution of the
writ. To Defendants Landlord and Booter, the mere reliance on the ordinance is insufficient to
find their private enforcement of the apartment parking lot arising to state action, referencing
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), Shipley v. First Fed. S&LAss 'n ofDe., 703 F.
Supp. 1122 (D.Del. 1998), and Weinrich v. Park City, 751 F.2d 357 (10 Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff then reiterates several of its arguments based upon Fuentes in its Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Applying Fuentes, Plaintiff asserts that two key due process
elements are absent, namely the seizure of personal property must be initiated by a government
official and that the seizure must be accompanied by adequate notice and an opportunity for a
hearing in a timely fashion. Plaintiff, citing Haefner and Wilson, suggest the first element is
important because the state must keep strict control over its monopoly on legitimate force and
citizens must resort to the judicial process rather than having all private citizens settle their
disputes privately. To Plaintiff, the common law right of self-help abatement rests with the
specially injured tenant who cannot find a lessee parking space and is now subject to a fine and
not allowed an opportunity to a hearing prior to the deprivation of his vehicle.
The Plaintiff affirms that the Landlord's and Booter's actions are an illegal lien, which
are outside the expressed authority of the City to create under Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution. To support this premise that private booting equates to an illegal lien, Plaintiff
5
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references 39 Am Jur. 2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges §349, §353, §358 and §369, Irvine v.
Wood, 51 NY 224 (NY Ct. App. 1872). Plaintiff argues that as an illegal lien, the Ordinance's
regulation of private booting violates the common law of self help of those specially injured,
relying on Lewis v. Pingree Nat. Bank, 151 P. 558 (Utah 1915) (holding a special injury was
found in a private nuisance abatement of a street obstruction). Lastly, Plaintiff professes that
based on Hansen v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691 (Utah 1968) and certain dictum in Keller v.
Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, the creation of an ordinance, in conflict
with the general law (i.e. the common law right to self help during a special injury) violates the
U.S. Constitution and Utah State Due Process clauses.
Responding, the City submits that the Plaintiff lacks standing to raise its constitutional
claims. Citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Utah 1983), the City implies that the
Plaintiff has not "suffered a distinct and palpable injury sufficient that gives him a personal stake
in the outcome of the legal dispute." See also Council ofHolladay City v. Larkin, 89 P.3d 164
(Utah 2004). The City alleges that while the Plaintiff was booted, the ordinance regulates the
Landlord's common law right to self help or boot and that the Landlord's compliance with the
regulation in no way creates an injury for the Landlord's otherwise valid actions. Moreover, the
City states that the booting of Plaintiff did not involve any state action or create an action under
the color of state law because the Ordinance does not authorize or require private booting,
encourage or require the City to assist private landlords regulate their own parking lots though
booting.
The City also responded to the Plaintiffs constitutional concerns. To the City, the
Ordinance meets the Due Process requirements, which articulated in Goichman v. City of Aspen,
6
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859 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1988) and Weinrauch, do not require a pre-deprivation hearing prior to
the impounding and towing of a vehicle under 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 actions because the payment
of a towing fee is equivalent to a bond, so long as a post-deprivation hearing is allowed
addressing the merits of the vehicles parking violation. The City also relies upon City of Los
Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003), stating the standards of Due Process in towing
situations require a review of three factors, (1) the level of private interest affected by the official
action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation in light of the value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards, and (3) the governmental interests involved (paraphrased). Applying
these factors, the City argues the up-front payment of a booting fee and temporary disablement of
Plaintiff car is not enough under City of Los Angeles. Also, the City states the opportunity to
dispute a parking fee exists in traffic court or small claims court, those alleviate any erroneous
deprivation concerns. And third, the City states the creation of a expeditious, pre-deprivation
hearing would be an "administrative nightmare." To the other constitutional issues, the City
argues the Ordinance does not prohibit otherwise legal booting, as it was legitimately crafted
under the City's business license powers under U.C.A. §10-1-203 and its general welfare powers
found in U.C.A. §10-8-84.
The Defendants Landlord and Booter also submitted a reply to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Promoting the same arguments as the City and those found in their
previous memoranda, the Landlord and Booter state the Plaintiff lacks standing because no
action has been taken by the City pursuant to the Ordinance. Moreover, these Defendants cite
Rienertsen v. Porter, 242 Ga. 624 (Ga. 1978), Forest Hills Garden Corp. v. Kowler, 436
N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. App. 1981), and Forest Hills Gardens Corp. v. Baroth, 555 N.Y.S.2d 1000
7
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(N.Y. 1990), to support the conceded principle that a common law right exists to enforce private
party parking restrictions. The Landlord and Booter then asserts the Plaintiffs reliance on
Fuentes' progeny is misplaced because several towing regulations have been reviewed for Due
Process and 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 concerns and found the valid exercise of private parties outside
any color of state law. Specifically, the defendants reference Hinman v. Lincoln Towing Service,
Inc., Ill F.2d 189,193 (7th Cir. 1985), which held a private actor, regulating private property
parking enforcement, was not encouraged or supported by an Illinois regulatory statute regulating
the imposition of a towing lien, because Illinois property owners, "long had the right to remove
by towing any unauthorized vehicles at the owner's expense." Lastly, Defendants Landlord and
Booter distinguishes Haefner and Wilson from the booting of Plaintiff s vehicle by asserting the
key distinctions in Wilson and Haefner was the presence of government initiators or actual
detainers, in Wilson city officials placed the boot {Wilson) and in Haefner county airport
employees instigated the towing.
The Plaintiff next responds to the City's argument, by asserting the fine of $50 for the
boot and the temporary loss of personal property establishes an injury under the standing
requirements needed to raise the issue of the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Plaintiff
concedes that a pre-deprivation notice and hearing are not required under the Due Process
Fuentes progeny throughout the Federal Court of Appeals. However, Plaintiff still professes the
failure of the Ordinance to require a timely, post-seizure hearing and argues the surrendering of
the City's police power to regulate private parking creates constitutional due process defects in
the Ordinance. Additionally, the Plaintiff states the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and
improperly preempts three valid general law areas, (1) self-help nuisance abatement remedies, (2)
8

2/¥

police power over quasi-public parking lots, and (3) the imposition of criminal liability to
specially injured persons exercising self-help. Such preemption into 'general law' invalidates the
Ordinance under the Plaintiffs interpretation ofHansen.
The City replies with only two new arguments. First, the City contends that Plaintiff has
not overcome the presumption of constitutionality required by legislative enactments, pursuant to
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 815 (Utah 1991) because no section of the
Ordinance is adequately demonstrated as vague and arbitrary enforcement does not threaten an
otherwise valid regulation. Second, the City argues Plaintiffs rationale regarding Hansen's
effect on a legislative act which arguably preempts certain common law rights is illogical and
improper because 'general law' is not equivalent to 'common law' and the City has broad
authority to pass the Ordinance under State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980).
Finally, in reply, Plaintiff asserts that standing must be extended to those being fined
pursuant to a Ordinance and that the affect of the Ordinance is significant in that it crosses the
line of permissible regulation. To Plaintiff, the City surrenders its police power and allows
illegal prejudgment garnishments by a private party exercising authority under the guise of the
Ordinance, absent due process protections, similarly ruled upon in Hatfield v. Williams, 64
F.R.D. 71 (N.D. Iowa 1974), Stuckers v. Thomas, 374 F. Supp. 178 (DCSD 1974), Fieldston
Property Owners' Ass 'n v. City of New York, 266 NYS 2d 97 (NY 1965), and J & M Parking
Management, Inc. v. City of New York, 1998 WestLaw 74303 (SDNY Fed. 1998) and discussed
in 32 ALR Fed 43 land 32 ALR 4th 728. The Plaintiff believes that the Ordinance could have
regulated the cost of booting only, but by licensing booting companies and the imposing
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regulations on landlord/tenant parking lots, the City must now create an administrative hearing
remedy in order to counter-balance the removal of the tenant's ability to instigate self-help.
Discussion
Apparent in the above, the parties have exhaustively argued the practice of booting
through a barrage of arguments, using holdings, dicta, and analogies from various case law
involving creditor/debtor, landlord/tenant, state/citizen involved from replevin actions to booting
and towing situations. The emotionally charged issues of booting, parking enforcement, private
landlord rights, and tenant rights are not absent constitutional direction, despite the length of the
arguments and the contradicting portrayal of case law by the parties. The issues surrounding the
Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 cause of action and various constitutional challenges to the
Ordinance can be divided distinctly into four central issues. First, does the Plaintiff have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Ordinance? Second, do the actions of the
Landlord and/or Booter constitute actions under the color of state law, and if so, does the City
and its Ordinance's failure to ensure an expeditious, administrative hearing violate the Due
Process clauses of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the
Utah State Constitution? Third, does the City have the authority to draft the Ordinance? And
fourth, is the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary? Each issue will be addressed in
turn.
Standing
Each of the Defendants in part challenge the standing of the Plaintiff, asserting that the
temporary deprivation of Plaintiff s personal property and the imposition of a $50 fee does not
give the Plaintiff a personal stake in the legal outcome of the case, or that the injury is deminis at
10
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best. The Plaintiff responds by reasserting its original position that the actions of the Landlord
and Booter are directly adverse to the Plaintiff and are performed under the mantle of an illegal
ordinance. The Utah Supreme Court has recently held, that in order to have standing, "a party
must allege that he or she has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable
to the conduct at issue such that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury." Provo City
Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14 Tf9, 86 P.3d 735. The party may not, however, "raise the claims
of any third party who are not before the court." Id. Present in the current case is the allegation
that Plaintiffs common law right to self help has been eviscerated by the passage of the
Ordinance and that the actions of the Landlord and Booter constituted a color of state law
situation. These and other arguments against the Ordinance and the Landlord and Booters
actions are directly traceable to the Plaintiffs injury, which can be qualified as the temporary
deprivation of his vehicle, the cost of paying the booting fee, and the time involved to seek a
redress.1
Civil Action Statute 42 U.S.C. §1983
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation ..., of any
State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress,... injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

1

Additionally, the Plaintiff has a right to challenge the constitutionality of the Ordinance
under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution, which states "all courts must be open
and every person is entitled to a remedy by due course of law fir injury doen to him or her or to
his or her property or reputation. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
11
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The Supreme Court has held that in actions asserting a violation of §1983, "the plaintiff must
allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and ... he must allege that the person
who has deprived him of that right acted under a color of state or territorial law." Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Massey v. OgdenArea Comm. Action Committee, Inc., 86
P.3d 120, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). A color of state law action is seen if (1) the actor performs
a function "normally exercised by the state," (2) the actor is coerced or encouraged by the state,
or (3) there is a close nexus between the actor and the state. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 543-546 (1987) (paraphrased in part). Any
person who acts under color of state law to cause the deprivation of rights, privileges or
immunities of another individual is liable to the injured party in an action at law, regardless of
the intent of the party is deprive the individual or not. Monroe v. Pape, 365 US 167 (1961). Yet
under Adickes v. S.K Kress & Co., 398 US 144 (1970), the complainant must show the violating
party acted with knowledge of and pursuant to the statute being challenged. The mere reference
to the Ordinance or adherence to the Ordinance will not create a color of state law action per se.
Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc, 372 F. Supp. 594, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(holding "state action does not necessarily result whenever a state renders any sort of benefit or
service to a private entity or seeks to regulate private activity in any degree whatever."); see also
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), (holding a state's warehouseman's lien statute
did not trigger a 1983 cause of action because the state did not compel the sale of the plaintiffs
possessions but merely announced the circumstances under which its courts would not interfere
with a private sale).
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Here, the Landlord and Booter both referenced the Ordinance by letter or indirectly with
the parking lot sign, suggesting that they acknowledge their actions were performed with a
knowledge of the Ordinance and arguably in conformity with the statute. However, the Landlord
states that his actions were not pursuant to the Ordinance but rather his common law to boot or
tow unwanted cars from his private property and that his right extends to his contracted agent, the
Booter. While the Plaintiff concedes the Landlord held a common law right to enforce the
parking on the Landlord's parking lot, the Plaintiff professes the Ordinance and subsequent
actions of the Landlord and Booter are sufficiently under the Ordinance to triggered a §1983
color of state law scenario.
The Plaintiff holds that the Ordinance abdicates the City's police power over the
enforcement of quasi-public parking, implying the Landlord's apartment parking lot qualifies as
quasi-public. However, this position is not supported. Under U.C.A. §41-6a-214(l), a "quasipublic ... parking area means a privately owned and maintained ... parking area that is generally
held open for use of the public for purposes of *.. parking." Based upon the language in the
Lease, retaining by contract the Landlord's right to enforce the parking within the parking lot,
and the Landlord's sign outside the Landlord's parking lot notifying the public to the parking
lot's enforcement by booting (as required by the Ordinance), the Landlord clearly demonstrated
the parking lot's private property status. The mere presence of visitor parking does not change
the status of the Landlord's parking lot to quasi-public because it is not continually held open to
the public but rather to 'visitors' of the Landlord's tenants. Moreover, the Plaintiff does not
argue any other usurpation by the Ordinance of police power over private parking enforcement
nor does the Plaintiff present any evidence that the city typically exercises its police powers in
13
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similar landlord/tenant parking lots. Thus, the Landlord and/or Booter is not exercising a normal
state function.
The Plaintiff holds the licensing requirements, expressed through the Ordinance, creates a
nexus with the state, however, this argument is both weak and unpersuasive. The Supreme Court
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 US 830, 842 (1982) held that a private school's decision to
discharge certain employees did not constitute an act under color of state law, even though the
school was regulated by state law, depended upon government contracts, and was supported by
public funds because the decision to discharge was not compelled or even influenced by any state
regulation and there was no "symbiotic relationship" between the school and the state. Similarly,
the mere presence of a licensing system and minor regulatory requirements does not create a
nexus with any state action. By contrast, the obvious entanglement of the state in its public
universities creates a sufficient nexus requiring the local university to implement additional due
process safeguards not required of private actors.
Next, reviewing whether the City, through th£ Ordinance, encourages the Landlord and
Booter to deprive the Plaintiff of personal property without due process, the Court notes the
Ordinance is absent any expressed authorization language granting licensed booting companies
the ability to initiate booting outside of the Landlord's common law right. Nonetheless, the
Plaintiff asserts the Ordinance encourages the Landlord and Booter because it allows landlords,
acting through certain licensed booters, to cloak their actions under the auspice of the state and
purposely disregard the rights of certain tenants (those parking in lots with four or more spaces).
It is here where parties diverge radically in interpreting the case law. The Plaintiff professes that
the dicta from Fuentes, Lugar, Mitchell, Wyatt and its relative progeny, extending these cases to
14
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various booting/towing cases, namely Saukstelis, Wilson, Sutton, Haefner, Patterson, and Gillam,
asserting a color of state law action is seen because Plaintiffs common law right to self help
following a special injury is completely removed by the City's passing of the Ordinance. To
Plaintiff, the Ordinance illegally allows booters to seize vehicles, synonymous to the City
crafting an ordinance allowing a private party to extort an illegal lien. Responding, the
Defendants asserts alternative approaches to the case law, professing that the involvement of
state actors in Plaintiffs various case law is clearly distinguishable from Landlord's decision to
boot Plaintiffs car in that there is no state involvement and the Ordinance merely regulates the
Landlord's common law rights. To Defendants, the booting of Plaintiff s vehicle is similar to a
bond required prior to post-deprivation hearings, relying on City of Los Angeles, Goichman and
Weinrauch. The Court is persuaded with the latter approach for a number of reasons.
First, the Plaintiff has not sufficiently established that he held a common law right to self
help without establishing the presence of a public or private nuisance because the Plaintiff is
potentially no more specially injured in this case than the Landlord. Under the only cited case
used to establish the Plaintiffs self-help remedy right, Lewis v. Pingree, 151 P. 558, 561 (Utah
1915), the Court held that private person may not invoke the aid of the courts to abate a public
nuisance, unless they can show that they suffer some special or peculiar injury or damage which
is not common to the rest of the community. See also Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144, 148
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding claimant must show damages were suffered different those of the
society at large, seen with a physical injury); Solar Salt Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 555
P.2d 286, 289 (Utah 1976). In Plaintiffs case, while booting may invoke a negative response to
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the operator of the restrained vehicle, it hardly qualifies as a public nuisance unique to the
Plaintiff.
The Plaintiffs reference to Irvine v. Wood, 51 NY 224 (NY Ct. App. 1872), a unique
private nuisance case, is likewise improper because in that case the landlord and tenant had
adequate notice of hazardous sidewalk and both failed to take action, causing the tenant to suffer
physically injuries. Under Utah's private nuisance case law, the claimant must show
"unreasonable conduct." Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing
People v. Burtlesen, 47 P.87, 89 (1986) and W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts §§ 88 & 90 (5th ed. 1984)). Here, the Plaintiff fails to show the Landlord's or
Booter's conduct was unreasonable or that he made any attempt to contact the Landlord to
provide any notice of a various parking enforcement concern until after Plaintiffs vehicle was
booted. While it is arguably an inconvenience to not find a permitted parking space adjacent to
the Landlord's apartment building and consequently pay fees to remove a boot placed on an
allegedly, improperly parked car, this is in no way qualifies as a special injury stemming from a
private nuisance. The Landlord's potential injuries arising from improper tenant and non-tenant
parking must also be considered. One vehicle in an unpermitted parking space may appear
trivial, however, the effects are felt by other tenants who consequently complain to the Landlord,
causing additional exerted energy and time to remove the trespassing vehicle by the Landlord
and/or his employees or agents.
Second, the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Ordinance encourages the Landlord and
Booters action because the parties openly contracted that the Landlord held the reserve the right
to regulate parking. Nowhere in the contract did the Landlord transfer any right to park in a
16

2*±

selected space or guaranteed the existence of a space in the regular parking. Section 12 of the
Lease specifically reads;
Tenant shall use only that parking space designated for use, and the Tenant shall
see to it that Tenant's guests use only the parking space provided for guest
parking. Use of parking other than as permitted, will not be allowed and the
vehicle in violation may be towed or disabled at Tenant's expense.
While the Plaintiff maintains that a regular parking space is implied in the Lease, such an
inference is inappropriate when read in conjunction with other provisions of the Lease limiting
the Landlord's liability. For example, Section 8 states;
Interruption or failure of any service maintained in the building in which the
apartment is located, if due to causes beyond Landlord's control, shall not entitle
Tenant to any claim against Landlord or to any reduction in rent,... unless
Landlord shall fail to take such measures as may be reasonable in the
circumstances to restore the service without undue delay.
While Section 8 does not expressly address services outside the building, it is rational to assume
the same standard of reasonableness should apply. Simply put, the Landlord's booting practices
appears to be a viable way to ensure the Plaintiff is given a parking space without causing the
drivers of wrongfully parked vehicles to go to an isolated storage facility to retrieve towed
property.
Third, the Plaintiffs reliance on certain creditor/debtors case law (i.e. Fuentes, Lugar,
Mitchell and Wyatt) and certain selected booting/towing cases (i.e. Saukstelis, Wilson, Sutton,
Haefner, Patterson, and Gillam,) is unpersuasive because the Ordinance regulates conflicting
property interests arising out of a landlord's self enforcement of a private parking lot independent
of any state action. Although Plaintiffs arguments suggest the Ordinance encourages certain
commensurate, illegal lien situations, recent, binding case law does not support this analogy. In
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Goichman, the Tenth Circuit expressly held "that requiring an individual to post the equivalent
fof] a bond ... [for disputed towing charges and parking fees] pending a hearing on the underlying
violation does not violate due process." 859 F.2d at 1468 (emphasis added). The Goichman
Court then went on to specifically distinguished the Fuentes line of cases, asserting the
distinction in Fuentes and other creditor/debtor replevin cases is the state's injecting actions, as
an intervener, which unjustly altered the balance of power in the parties relationship. Id. at 146970. To Goichman, towing cases (and booting cases) were different because the state makes no
claim on the res, rather the actions stem from the state's legitimate welfare and police powers,
and ready access to a post-deprivation hearing exists. Id. at 1470. While the Plaintiff may persist
that Saukstelis, Wilson, Sutton, Haefner, Patterson, Gillam, 39 Am Jur. 2d Highways, Streets,
and Bridges §349, §353, §358 and §369 stand for the principle that any legislative enactment
involving booting requires, pursuant to the Due Process Clause, a guaranteed post-deprivation
hearing, those cases are distinguishable in that they all involve state actors initiating the booting
or towing or towing and booting on public property by booters or towers contracted with a state
actor. Here, the Landlord makes no claim on the vehicle but seeks only to alleviate improper
parking. And although the Plaintiff does have a protected interest in his personal property, the
state is not involved in the decision to boot, the Landlord continually holds an expressed right to
regulate the private parking lot, and the Landlord or its contracted agent (the Booter) initiated the
boot.
Fourth, the Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Weinrauch, Goichman, and City of Los Angeles is
inaccurate. While admitting that a pre-deprivation hearing may not be required, the Plaintiff
asserts that Weinrauch, Goichman, and City of Los Angeles is not completely on point because
18
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the Landlord hired a licensed booter who, acting as a private party under contract with the
Landlord, was allowed to initiate booting for profit. In Goichman, the Tenth Circuit held "due
process is a flexible concept, and its procedural protections will vary depending on the particular
deprivation involved." Id. at 1468; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The
Goichman Court also held that the payment of towing fees does not violate due process so long
as a hearing was available on the underlying violation. 859 F.2d at 1469. Plaintiff believes that
Weinrauch, Goichman, and City of Los Angeles still requires the City to assure that a hearing is
available and that the Ordinance does not address this due process concern, regardless of the
availability of the traffic or small claims court.
Looking at City of Los Angeles City, the U.S. Supreme Court set forward a three-factor
test in Mathews as an additional test to measure adequate due process is found in towing/booting
cases. According to City of Los Angeles, the Court should weigh three factors, (1) the level of
private interest affected by the official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation in light of the
value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the governmental interests
involved. 538 U.S. at 717 (paraphrased). Applying the Mathews test to this case, the Defendants'
approach is correct. Here, the level of private interests, the tenants or non-tenants vehicles
deprived by booting and the loss of Landlord's parking space create sufficient conflicting private
interests, which arguably are not affected by the Ordinance because the same conflicts and ability
to initiate booting existed prior to the Ordinance's enactment. The risk of erroneous deprivation
may exist, but the Ordinance seeks to protect the tenant from such risks in Section E, F, and G
thereof, by creating criminal liability for charging an excessive or unlisted fee, failing to
informed the Plaintiff of the booting practice, or failing to be informed on parking enforcement
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regarding regular or visitor parking. Lastly, the governmental interest involved in the regulating
of private landlord/tenant parking lots is minimal. The City's Ordinance interest in insuring its
citizens are protected from wrongful self-help actions is counter-balanced by the deterring
possibility of criminal liability and the Plaintiffs availability to assert a wrongful self-help cause
of action in the City's small claims court.
City Authority
Next, the Plaintiff argues the City lacks the authority to pass an ordinance which conflicts
with general law. To the Plaintiff, the Ordinance conflicts with the general law governing certain
self-help nuisance abatement remedies, certain police powers over quasi-public parking lots, and
certain specially injured persons exercising self-help. Responding, Defendant counter the
Ordinance was drafted pursuant to the City's business license powers under U.C.A. §10-1-203
and its general welfare powers found in U.C.A. §10-8-84. Reviewing Hansen and Keller, the
Court finds no basis or merit in Plaintiffs arguments. As previously discussed, the Plaintiff has
not demonstrated a special injury existed, producing the ability to exert a self-help nuisance
abatement remedy. Erickson, 877 P.2d 144. Additionally, the Landlord's parking lot does not
constitute a quasi-public parking lot. Therefore, the Court agrees with the City that the state's
involvement does not unlawfully exceed into areas outside the City's valid authority to regulate
business licenses and the general welfare of its citizens, under U.C.A. §10-1-203 and U.C.A.
§10-8-84.
Other Constitutional Concerns
Lastly, the Plaintiff argues the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary and
capricious and unclear in that it allows landlords to issue parking permits in excess to actually
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spaces, in its application to non-landlord/tenant quasi-public parking lots, and its notice
requirements. Despite the Plaintiffs characteristics of the Ordinance's notice provisions in
Section E as vague, the Plaintiff clearly enjoys the benefits of Section F, which requires landlords
to explain their parking restrictions. Thus, Plaintiff has greater notification rights than others
parking in either quasi-public or private parking lots with three or less parking spaces under
Section F. The Plaintiffs other arguments are inappropriate under a vagueness challenge and
have previously been addressed under the Court's City of Los Angeles analysis. •
Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
and grants the City's Motion to Dismiss and Defendant Landlord and Defendant's Booter's
Motion to Dismiss. Counsel for the City is directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith.
Dated this / 5 ^ d a y of July, 2005.
BY THE COURT
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